

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
AUGUSTA DIVISION

TAVARRES HENDERSON,	)	
a.k.a. Juhiiv Ali Muhammed,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CV 121-179
	)	
ATTORNEY GENERAL CHRISTOPHER	)	
M. CARR; GEORGIA DEPT OF PUBLIC	)	
SAFETY; THERMAL CERANMIC	)	
PROPANE INC.; and, DISTRICT	)	
ATTORNEY JOSHUA B. SMITH,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

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**MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

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Plaintiff, an inmate at Johnson State Prison (“JSP”) in Wrightsville, Georgia, seeks to proceed *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”) in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. no. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP be **DENIED**, (doc. no. 2), Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel be **DENIED**, (doc. no. 3), and this action be **DISMISSED** without prejudice.

**I. BACKGROUND**

A prisoner attempting to proceed IFP in a civil action in federal court must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the PLRA provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

“This provision of the PLRA, commonly known as the three strikes provision, requires frequent filer prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their lawsuits and appeals.” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted), *abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1726 (U.S. 2020) (“The point of the PLRA, as its terms show, was to cabin not only abusive but also simply meritless prisoner suits.”). The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of § 1915(g) because it does not violate an inmate’s right to access the courts, the doctrine of separation of powers, an inmate’s right to due process of law, or an inmate’s right to equal protection. Id. at 721-27.

## **II. DISCUSSION**

### **A. Dismissal Is Warranted Because Plaintiff Has Three Strikes Under § 1915(g)**

A review of Plaintiff’s history of filings reveals he has brought at least three cases that were dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim and count as strikes: (1) Henderson v. Augusta Judicial Circuit, 1:20-CV-175 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2021) (dismissing for failure to state a claim); (2) Henderson v. Mastny, 1:19-CV-017 (S.D. Ga. May 19, 2019); (dismissing for failure to state a claim); (3) Henderson v. Roundtree, 1:18-CV-063 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2018) (dismissing for failure to state a claim). Because Plaintiff has at least three strikes, he cannot proceed IFP unless he can demonstrate he qualifies for the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to § 1915(g). Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 873 (11th Cir. 2017).

### **B. Plaintiff Does Not Qualify for the Imminent Danger Exception**

In order to come within the imminent danger exception, a prisoner must be in imminent danger at the time he files suit in district court, not at the time of the alleged incident that serves as the basis for the complaint. Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff alleges in 2008 while working for Richmond County to perform safety inspections, Defendants failed to follow safety protocol and ignored Plaintiff's concerns. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 9-16.)

Plaintiff's allegations do not demonstrate he "faced 'a present imminent danger.'" Daker v. United States, 787 F. App'x 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2019) (*per curiam*) (citing Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff makes no allegations of danger or harm. Without specific allegations that an injury is imminent or threatened, Plaintiff does not satisfy the imminent danger exception. See Odum v. Bryan Cnty, Judicial Circuit, No. CV 4:07-181, 2008 WL 766661, at \*1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2008) (requiring specific allegations grounded in specific facts indicating injury is imminent).

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he should be excused from paying the full filing fee under the "imminent danger" exception to § 1915(g)'s three strike rule.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

In sum, Plaintiff has accumulated at least three strikes against him and cannot satisfy the dictates of the "imminent danger" exception of § 1915(g). Thus, he fails to demonstrate that he should be excused from paying the full filing fee. Therefore, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP be **DENIED**, (doc. no. 2), and this action be **DISMISSED** without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with the claims raised

in this case, he should be required to initiate a new lawsuit, which would require submission of a new complaint. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002).

### C. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se* and moves for the appointment of counsel, arguing he needs an attorney due to his poverty status and inability to hire legal counsel. (Doc. no. 3.) Because Plaintiff is not entitled to proceed with this case, his motion for appointment of counsel should be **DENIED**. However, even if the Court were not recommending dismissal of the case, Plaintiff is not entitled to appointed counsel.


As a general rule, there is no entitlement to appointed counsel in a civil rights case such as this one. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992). Rather, the appointment of counsel is a privilege justified only by exceptional circumstances. *Id.*; see also Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding exceptional circumstances justified appointment of counsel where suspect conduct of prison officials hindered prisoner plaintiff’s ability to present essential merits of case and, additionally, where such appointment would alleviate security concerns and help sharpen issues).

Here, Plaintiff fails to show exceptional circumstances exist to justify the appointment of counsel. Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not shown that his status as a layman prevents him from “presenting the essential merits of his . . . position,” which is the key consideration in determining whether the appointment of counsel is justified. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993). Indeed, Plaintiff has been able to communicate with the Court and present the merits of his case, as evidenced by his factually-detailed filings with the Court, including exact dates of events. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel should be **DENIED**. (Doc. no. 3.)

### III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has accumulated at least three strikes against him and cannot satisfy the dictates of the “imminent danger” exception of § 1915(g). Thus, he fails to demonstrate that he should be excused from paying the full filing fee. Therefore, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP be **DENIED** (doc. no. 2), and this action be **DISMISSED** without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with the claims raised in this case, he should be required to initiate a new lawsuit, which would require submission of a new complaint. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court also **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** that the motion for appointment of counsel be **DENIED**. (Doc. no. 3.)

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of December, 2021, at Augusta, Georgia.



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BRIAN K. EPPS  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA